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Abstract 
Originalism has long been used as a conceptual approach for interpreting the United States 
Constitution. Its premise is that the authoritative interpretation of constitutional documents is 
best obtained by determining the meaning of their texts as they were understood at the time of 
their creation, along with the intent of their drafters and adopters. This article examines both 
the potential and the limitations of originalism when applied to the Treaty of Waitangi, and 
explores how the manner in which the Treaty’s provisions were devised, drafted, and 
subsequently acceded to militates against the sort of exactness of interpretation that originalism 
offers elsewhere. 
 
 
Introduction 
Since 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal has been primarily responsible – along with the courts, 
politicians, and academics – for interpreting the meaning and application of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (“the Treaty”) (1840). One of the underlying challenges in this process has been to 
establish the role and function of this instrument of colonialism in what some might claim is a 
post-colonial setting. And as the few remaining historical claims before the Tribunal near 
settlement, the status of the constitutional role of the Treaty has been kept buoyant by an 
increase in calls for it to be formally installed as a central element in New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework.1 However, in both the work of the Tribunal and in the arguments of 
those advocating for the Treaty to have a more formal constitutional position in the country, 
the interpretation of the agreement has altered dramatically from that apparently intended by 
its creators.  
What is explored here is the potential role of originalism – of the sort employed in debates 
about the meaning of United States Constitution – as a method of constitutional interpretation 
to be applied to the Treaty. As the Treaty shifts from being the focal point of a heavily contested 
relationship between the Crown and Māori based on the resolution of grievances to potentially 
assuming a more explicit constitutional status, issues of the Treaty’s original meaning (and the 
intent of the framers of and assenters to the agreement) are likely to become more pronounced.   
The Treaty is presently interpreted in statute and by the Tribunal according to its spirit 
or principles, and it is these principles, and “not the literal words” of the Treaty that the courts 
consider when interpreting legislative references to the agreement.2 Sharp refers to the 
principles as contributing to the “jurisprudence of the wairua of the Treaty,” in which there is 
a “still-living spirit” of the agreement that governs its interpretation.3 This approach to the 
Treaty, in which the principles take precedence over its provisions, is the orthodox position 
regarding its interpretation.  As far as the literal meanings of the Treaty’s texts are concerned, 
the courts have determined that they “should not be approached with the austerity of tabulated 
legalism.”4 The example of the “partnership” principle is cited by Matthew Palmer as evidence 
of this current orthodoxy, in which the interpretation of the Treaty is oriented away from the 
provisions of its texts – what could loosely be called an originalist approach – and towards the 
principles and spirit of the text.5 
The dependence on the “principles of the Treaty” – which has been the preferred phrase 
(since the passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975) for capturing elements of the spirit of 
the Treaty has enabled the interpretation of the Treaty to adjust to accommodate legislative and 
social changes that have occurred since its conclusion. This orthodoxy has been augmented not 
only through legislation and the decisions of the courts and Waitangi Tribunal, but also in 
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anticipation of a more prominent role of the Treaty in an anticipated written constitution for 
New Zealand.6  
Exploring the application of originalism to the Treaty affords the opportunity for an 
alternative and/or complementary interpretation of the agreement. It need not be a challenge to 
current Treaty orthodoxy, although some dimensions of originalism do question the connection 
of certain Treaty principles with the intent both of the agreement’s provisions, and those of its 
authors. Establishing an originalist position on the Treaty is complex, however, because parts 
of the texts are ambiguous, and after nearly 180 years, there remains no consensus on its precise 
meaning and application.7 And unlike the United States Constitution, from the outset the Treaty 
has lacked provision for formal amendments to be added. Consequently, its subsequent 
interpretations have evolved in a more ad hoc fashion, with certain principles and readings of 
the agreement serving as de facto amendments. To an extent, these reflect a presentist approach 
to the Treaty’s interpretation – the antithesis of any attempt to reach an originalist 
understanding of the agreement.  Formalising the Treaty in a constitution would almost 
certainly require a more specific statement or agreement of its meaning, thus likely bringing 
into focus (among other considerations) the issue of originalism in its interpretation.8 The 
current interpretive orthodoxy that applies to the Treaty, which emphasises its principles and 
spirit over consideration of the original meaning of the Treaty’s text and intent of its authors 
and signatories, suggests that there could be a significant role an originalist perspective could 
play as consideration is given to the Treaty’s future constitutional status.9 Fletcher argues that 
the purpose in focussing on the intent of the framers of the English text of the Treaty ‘is not to 
elevate the status of the English draft or to diminish that of the Maori text. Nor is it to depreciate 
modern efforts, particularly those of the Waitangi Tribunal, in developing an understanding of 
the Treaty that reconciles and transcends its texts’. He also cautions against promoting original 
intent as a means of ‘controlling Treaty interpretation, as is familiar from interpretations of the 
United States Constitution by reference to the understandings of the Founding Fathers’, 
(although he adds the caveat that the possibility exists that ‘some of the historical assumptions 
which have been starting points for contemporary legal argument should be revisited’).10 
Putting aside concerns over the motive or consequences of the application of an 
originalist approach, however, what is revealed here is that applying originalist analyses to the 
Treaty not only does little to advance the understanding of the agreement, but potentially makes 
the task of establishing a precise and coherent and uniform meaning and purpose of the Treaty 
more challenging.  
 
Originalism 
Originalism is used most commonly to emphasise both the binding authority of the text of the 
United States Constitution and the intention of its framers. Despite the term being devised as 
recently as 1979, the principles behind it have been applied in the United States since at least 
1803 in connection with the Constitution.11 And for centuries before that,12 in common law, 
the object of all statutory interpretation has been ‘to determine what intention is conveyed, 
either expressly or impliedly, by the language used’.13 Because of this long history of 
emphasising the interpretation of legal documents (into which category constitutional texts can 
sometimes fall as quasi-legal documents)14 based primarily on their wording, a corresponding 
degree of precision has typically been invested in their drafting (the United States Constitution, 
for example, was praised by one jurist for ‘the remarkable…exactness of its text’).15 The Treaty 
of Waitangi, on the other hand, is noted for having been ‘hastily and inexpertly drawn up’, and 
‘ambiguous and contradictory in content’.16 This introduces the issue of the extent of the 
precision of wording in constitutional texts as a consideration in the application of originalism 
to those texts: the more imprecise the wording, the less originalism can be employed in general 
as an exclusive tool of interpretation. 
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Originalism is comprised of two general principles: textualism and intentionalism.  The 
first of these – textualism – relies on interpreting a constitutional text as it was intended to be 
understood when it came into being. The wording of such documents is thus treated as ‘a 
vehicle for the voice of the people at the time of enactment’.17 The notion is more nuanced, 
though than just a depending on a contemporaneous understanding of the relevant texts. It has 
evolved from focussing on the ‘original intent’ of the drafters of the constitutional document 
to the ‘original understanding’ of those who first gave consent to it,18 and the ‘original public 
meaning’ of the text in question.19 This latter approach is sometimes known as the Doctrine of 
Original Meaning.20 Among the challenges this modified version of originalism presents is that 
while the text of a constitutional document is fixed, the contemporaneous understanding of 
those who consent to or enacted it not only is likely to be varied, but the documentary record 
of those views might be inconsistent, or in the case of some of the Māori signatories to the 
Treaty of Waitangi, non-existent in many instances. 
There are also degrees of originalism. The strongest of these is the exclusive form, in 
which the meaning of original constitutional texts are interpreted with no reference to any 
subsequent precedent, practice, policy, or interpretation. From this, the next stage is a more 
inclusive originalism, which admits later precedent, policy and practice, to the extent that they 
can be incorporated or concur with the original text in question.21 The final gradient is partial 
originalism, in which the original meaning and intent of the constitutional document becomes 
just one (albeit possibly a significant one) of several criteria for interpretation.22 In all these 
variants, however, the underlying principle of originalism remains: that it is possible to 
discover the certain meaning of a constitutional text at the time of its creation or adoption, but 
also, crucially, that this meaning “is authoritative for the purposes of constitutional 
interpretation in the present.”23  
However, as has sometimes been the case with the Treaty of Waitangi, the imprecision 
of the wording of a constitutional document can make the application of textual originalism so 
challenging that meaning has to be sought elsewhere to assist with efforts at interpretation. The 
use of contemporaneous contextual evidence to enhance the interpretation of the Treaty is vital. 
Yet drawing on such evidence dilutes the purist textualist element of originalism by implying 
that interpretation of the agreement without this additional context-setting evidence would 
diminish rather than enhance the ability to derive a useful and reliable meaning from the 
Treaty’s text. 
The counterpart in originalism to textualism (in its various forms) is intentionalism. In 
principle, intentionalism is supposed to serve a complementary function – marrying the 
historical meaning of the text of a constitutional document with the intentions of those involved 
in its drafting and adoption. However, such a union is based on the uncertain presumption that 
the two categories of understanding are likely to be very similar, with each illuminating the 
other in a largely consistent manner. The problem with such an approach, though, is that it 
bypasses consideration of those circumstances in which various parties involved in the 
formation or ratification of a constitutional text may have divergent or even contradictory 
interpretations of the text. The intent of these parties would still come under the umbrella of 
originalism, but that alone is no guarantee that a homogeneous interpretation of the text will 
emerge. The application of intentionalism to the Waitangi treaty presents a particular set of 
challenges, in that the accounts of the intent of the Māori signatories to the agreement are 
sparse, and what fragments were recorded were done through the optic of a colonial European 
perspective. The Waitangi Tribunal’s 2014 report on Stage One of the Te Paparahi o Te Raki 
Inquiry explored the possible understandings that the Māori signatories of the Treaty had about 
the agreement, but these tended to focus on the definitions of sovereignty rather than what one 
rangatira referred to as “squinty legalism.”24 Some of the testimony presented before the 
Tribunal illustrates the variants of originalist interpretations of sovereignty that Hickford has 
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described. For example, there can be a claim of overarching territorial sovereignty coexisting 
with jurisdictional autonomy within the territory.25 
Generally, within the originalist framework of thought, the role of intentionalism has 
greater potential than textualism because the text of any constitutional document is the product 
of specific intentions, and because there is an extra layer of intentions held by those who 
endorse or ratify, and thereby give effect to the text. This means at the very least that attempts 
to recover the original meaning of a constitutional text do not have to be limited solely to 
scrutiny of the text itself.26 Indeed, it could be argued that a textualist approach would be 
deficient without some intentionalist context. A related argument used by intentionalists to 
support this approach to interpreting constitutional texts is that “[i]f history can provide a 
reliable guide to the intent of those who crafted constitutional language, then it may be possible 
for judges to base their decisions upon neutral principles as opposed to their personal 
predisposition.”27 In an area as fraught with division over interpretations as the Treaty of 
Waitangi, this appeal to apparent neutrality can be a compelling argument in support of 
intentionalism. Use of the concept can serve as “a solution to the question of legitimacy,” which 
both reveals the “authoritative” intent of a constitutional text, and “solves the question of 
interpretation” in a way that is unaffected by later partisan approaches to interpretation of the 
agreement.28  
There are, however, some deficiencies with originalism that need to be given 
consideration in any assessment of its potential application to the Treaty. Advocates of 
originalism presuppose that there is a degree of authenticity in textualism and intentionalism, 
on the basis that it is somehow uncontaminated by later constitutional, policy, or general 
historical developments (which are perceived almost as accretions that need to be cleaned away 
to reveal the “true” relief of the meaning of the original constitutional text). But from a broader 
perspective, the efficacy of originalism depends not so much on any inherit merit it possesses 
as on the contribution it makes to a good system of constitutional interpretation, which 
ultimately is a subjective judgement.29 Claims of original intent, original textual meaning, and 
greater authenticity and authority are a false syllogism in this context. 
Moreover, when it comes to the intentionalist branch of originalism, there is a 
presumption in originalism that the intention of the drafters, endorsers, or adopters of a 
constitutional text can be completely or at least sufficiently known.30 Yet allowances have to 
be made for secret motives, unknown motives, the distinction between public and private 
motives, the absence of evidence of intentions, and evolving intentions as the constitutional 
text goes from being formulated to being adopted and approved. All of these can obstruct the 
task of determining a unitary set of intentions of the drafters of a constitutional text. A 
distinction therefore needs to be drawn in intentionalism between the covert (and therefore 
presumably speculative or unknowable) motives of those involved in formulating a 
constitutional text, and the sort of intentions that others involved in the text at the time 
(including signatories, in the case of the Treaty) could reasonably have been expected to 
know.31 Yet even if this distinction can be made, there can be a substantial methodological 
challenge when trying to convert the intentions of the various drafters and those who acceded 
to a constitutional text into a single collective representative intent that is coherent enough to 
assist with contemporary interpretations.32 
In addition, originalism positions whichever constitutional text is under consideration as 
a culminating point in policy-making and document-drafting. From the moment of its 
ratification or adoption, its meaning is thereafter held in perpetuity – despite any subsequent 
changes in culture, society, and economy – by what has pejoratively been referred to as the 
“will of the dead.”33 This can lead to the risk of constitutional texts metaphorically calcifying, 
and being incapable of subsequent suppleness in interpretation and application.  The alternative 
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to this aspect of originalism is to regard the moment at which constitutional texts come into 
effect as a commencement rather than termination point for subsequent interpretation.34  
At some point, originalism inevitably enters the realm of counterfactual history, in that 
its advocates are required to hypothesise how the drafters of or signatories to a constitutional 
text would have interpreted later events in light of the document they produced or assented to. 
Would they, for example, have insisted that the original meaning or intent remain fixed 
regardless of any subsequent social, political, cultural or other changes occurring? Speculation 
thus becomes a corollary to the implementation of originalism, and in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, it could be just as possible that those involved in the creation and 
acceptance of a constitutional text would have allowed later changes in interpretation of the 
text. The difficulty is that there is no way of knowing for sure, and so the absence of evidence 
one way or the other unavoidably makes claims of originalism open to conjecture.  
Inevitably, originalism serves as a political as much as a purely interpretive instrument. 
By privileging the supposed authority of the original meaning and intent over subsequent 
understandings of a constitutional text, the originalist interpretation can potentially be used to 
sway opinion in decisions where the meaning of the text has some material effect. In some 
instances, it can act as a reactive theory, or as a mode of criticising views that are contrary to 
its advocates.35 Those promoting an originalist approach do so either purely as an academic 
exercise (in which case the purpose has little practical application beyond exploring the 
possible implications of an alternative interpretation), or because an originalist interpretation 
can provide a meaning more suited to their interests than other meanings. This undermines 
claims that originalism is somehow a superior form of interpreting constitutional texts, or that 
it carries any specific authority over other interpretive approaches.  
Finally, dogmatic originalism has the potential to eschew broader academic debate about 
the meaning of constitutional texts. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, it can imply that all 
later interpretations of a constitutional text are somehow either improper or erroneous, and 
therefore do not carry the same weight as originalist interpretations do.36 Yet, ironically, it can 
be through the analysis of subsequent interpretations and applications of a constitutional text 
that the originalist reading becomes more defined. 
 
An originalist interpretation of the Treaty 
In order to see what the potential implications of an originalist approach to the Treaty of 
Waitangi could be, it is first necessary to outline – as far as possible – the intent of the creators 
and signatories to the agreement, and the meaning of the text itself. Although the Treaty has 
been subject to extensive research, particularly since the late 1970s, universal agreement on its 
meaning and application has yet to be reached. This is partly because of the poor wording of 
the text as it was drafted, in English (and the ensuing deficiencies when the text was translated 
into Māori), partly because the intersection of textualism and intentionalism still does not 
provide a unitary meaning of the agreement’s provisions, and partly because of the several 
interpretations of the Treaty’s meaning that have emerged since its conclusion in 1840, 
including the derivation of a set of “principles” from the text. The following two sections sketch 
out an originalist interpretation of the Treaty using first a textualist followed by an intentionalist 
approach. 
  
(i) A textualist approach to originalism in the Treaty 
 
What is examined here is the “raw” meaning of the Treaty’s three operative articles (which 
give effect to the agreement) in both its English and Māori texts.37 Some (but certainly not all) 
of the original meanings of the articles are surveyed, and the various challenges faced when 
attempting to determine the express or implied intention of the language used is examined as a 
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means of illustrating the type of deficiency that the textualist form of originalism poses when 
it comes to interpreting the Treaty.38  
In Article the First of the English version of the Treaty, all sovereignty is ceded by 
Māori to the Crown “absolutely and without reservation.”39 The meaning is unambiguous at 
first sight, except that it raises some important questions, including: sovereignty over whom 
(which is not specified); what was the Māori conception of sovereignty at this time (which is 
not clarified); and from a circumstantial perspective, why would even one rangatira (chief), let 
alone 542, surrender all their sovereignty to the Crown, where there was neither a threat nor 
any great inducement to do so? The translated version only muddies the waters, with the 
rangatira surrendering their right of governance (“kāwanatanga”) to the Crown. This raises 
additional questions, including: did governance mean the same thing as sovereignty in 1840? 
And did Māori understand what kāwanatanga meant? (given that its root word, “kāwana” was 
a neologism for the English word “governor”). 
Article the Second is a more intricate and ambiguous part of the Treaty from a textualist 
perspective. It comprises two elements, the first of which guarantees Māori “the full exclusive 
and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties” 
which they may own. What is not clear from this, though, is whether the extent of ownership 
made explicit in this article – especially the undisturbed nature of the possession – leaves at 
least a faint residue of sovereignty with Māori (in that presumably no other sovereign power 
can disturb the nature of their possession). The translated version makes the role of sovereignty 
even less clear, with rangatira being guaranteed “the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship 
over their lands, villages and all their treasures” – in this context, chieftainship has connotations 
of sovereignty, which undermines the full cession of sovereignty by the Crown in Article of 
the First of the English version.40 Textualism alone offers no adequate resolution to this 
apparent contradiction. 
The second part of Article the Second deals with the issue of pre-emption. In the English 
text, Māori give to the Crown the right to purchase their land at an agreed price. However, if a 
price is not agreed on, it is unclear from the article whether Māori would then have the right to 
offer their land for sale to non-Crown parties. Nor is it obvious for what period this provision 
was meant to apply. The translated portion of this article mirrors both this meaning and these 
deficiencies in the English text. 
The Treaty’s final article (which has a similar meaning in both the English and Māori 
versions) guarantees that Māori will be protected by the Crown and will enjoy “all the Rights 
and Privileges of British Subjects.” One of the first questions to arise from this portion of the 
text is from whom are Māori to be protected? And does this protection extend to one group of 
Māori which is under attack from another? This latter question is not merely hypothetical as it 
could have been a consideration for some rangatira when giving their assent to the Treaty. And 
neither is there any indication as to what form the protection would take, and for how long it 
would last. When Crown forces invaded the Waikato in 1863, for example, and forcibly seized 
486,500 hectares of Māori land, did this mean that the Crown was bound by the Treaty to 
defend Māori from its own offensives? This may seem like a vexatious example, but it is 
nonetheless a useful one because it highlights precisely a practical case where the permutations 
of Crown protection of Māori and the exact citizenship status of Māori are not able to be 
determined from the text alone.  
The issue of sovereignty emerges again in Article the Third. The promise that Māori will 
be imparted “all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects” suggests that they will have 
these benefits without possibly actually becoming British subjects. The key word in this phrase 
is “of,” which can imply that Māori did not become British subjects according to the text of the 
Treaty. Yet, if Māori had ceded sovereignty to the Crown, as is made explicit in Article the 
First of the English text, then it would be fair to interpret this as evidence that Māori were thus 
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subject to British rule and therefore British subjects (making this segment of Article the Third 
redundant if it is to be interpreted as Māori being confirmed as British subjects). This ambiguity 
is not resolved by applying a textualist form of originalism to the agreement. 
It is evident that the wording of the English text of the Treaty does not allow for a single, 
unambiguous meaning of the agreement to emerge, and that this uncertainty is compounded by 
the differences between the English and Māori texts of the Treaty. A purely textualist approach 
to the agreement therefore fails to produce anywhere near the exactness of meaning that some 
jurists believe they have achieved by applying textualism to the United States Constitution.41   
 
(ii) An intentionalist approach to originalism in the Treaty 
 
Applying an intentionalist approach to interpreting the Treaty is more complex in some ways 
than the textualist method because there is no single set of intentions which can be explored to 
approximate the original meaning of the agreement. In the case of the Treaty of Waitangi, there 
are three broad groups whose intentions need to be determined in order to explore an 
intentionalist interpretation of the agreement. The scope of such an undertaking would be well 
beyond the constraints of space of an article such as this, but a few selected intentions from 
each of the three groups can be examined, and at least allow for an impression of how intentions 
can shape the interpretation of a constitutional text – especially one where the text itself is 
plainly inadequate in parts to determine its exact meaning.  
The first of the three groups whose intentions have a bearing on establishing the original 
meaning of the Treaty are the officials in the British Government who worked on the idea of a 
treaty with New Zealand during 1839. There are three main sources of material on their 
intentions: their minutes, memoranda, letters, and other written communications at this time 
which reveal their evolving thinking about the content and purpose of the proposed Treaty; the 
instructions for the Treaty given to William Hobson in August 1839; and traces of the 
philosophical influences on these policy-makers. 
The documents generated by British officials in the year preceding the instructions for 
the Treaty being issued to Hobson are certainly useful when trying to determine the intentions 
of colonial officials for this constitutional text.42 During 1839, Sir James Stephen, the 
Permanent Undersecretary of the Colonial Office, was primarily responsible for developing the 
policy on a treaty with New Zealand. In March of that year, he stated his preference for an 
administration to be established in the prospective colony to govern “the Anglo Saxon Race” 
living in New Zealand, and three months later, as the British population in the country 
continued to expand, he argued for the extension of the Crown’s jurisdiction to “British 
subjects” who had settled in New Zealand.43 In May, the British Colonial Secretary, Lord 
Normanby, wrote to the British Attorney General, recommending that a cession of Māori 
sovereignty be secured so that there could be “some system for governing the numerous body 
of British subjects who have taken up their abode in the New Zealand Islands.”44  On 22 June 
1839, a Treasury official wrote to Stephen, reiterating that a consul be appointed to New 
Zealand in order to establish “some competent control over British subjects” living there, and 
the following month, the Treasury sanctioned the funding for the proposed administration 
which would be charged with exercising this “competent control.”45  
What is evident from this very cursory review is that the intention for the Treaty, as far 
as British officials were concerned during 1839, was explicitly to gain the right for British law 
to apply to British subjects living in New Zealand. There was no mention made at all in this 
period of British jurisdiction extending to Māori. Yet, while this intent is clear in the 
documentation produced by officials in the period leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty, 
it does not necessarily allow for a more precise understanding of the intent of the agreement 
itself. This is partly because the boundaries of British sovereignty are not made explicit in the 
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texts of the Treaty, and because the various humanitarian, cultural, religious, social, and 
economic intentions of a range of British officials (mainly from the Colonial Office and the 
Treasury) became slightly more implied than explicit when they were condensed into a single 
document that was the one of the bases (but by no means the only one) from which the text of 
the Treaty was assembled by its drafters.46 
In mid-August 1839, a set of Instructions was given to William Hobson (who was about 
to leave for New Zealand to draft and conclude the Treaty) by Normanby.47 These were the 
distillation of the preceding year’s deliberations on the New Zealand question by British 
officials (mainly from the Colonial Office, with some input from the Treasury), and give as 
clear an indication as exists of the British Government’s intentions for the Treaty immediately 
prior to its text being written.48 Yet even the Instructions are insufficient to derive an 
unambiguous inventory of points that the British intended for the Treaty, which Hickford has 
identified as being one of the challenges in attempting to construct an originalist interpretation 
of the (English text of the) Treaty.49  
The teleological basis of the Instructions was to “adopt the most effective measures for 
establishing amongst them [British immigrants] a settled form of civil Government.” This is 
described in the Instructions as the “principal object” of Hobson’s mission, and suggests that 
this is the way in which the text of the Treaty was originally intended to be interpreted, although 
it still does not overcome the dilemma evident in the textualist interpretation, in which 
sovereignty appears to be distributed in ambiguous ways among both Māori and the Crown. 
The issue of sovereignty in the Instructions is not straightforward, though. Britain 
acknowledged Māori sovereignty, but in a severely qualified form, as officials regarded Māori 
society as being “composed of numerous dispersed and petty tribes, who possess few political 
relations to each other, and are incompetent to act or even deliberate in concert.”  However, 
the instructions are not sufficiently explicit on whether the Māori sovereignty that was to be 
ceded to the Crown was to allow Hobson to govern the “not less than two thousand British 
subjects” in the country, amongst whom were “many persons of bad and doubtful character,” 
or whether Hobson was required to assert a blanket sovereignty over everyone in the country. 
The Instructions tilt towards the former interpretation, but nowhere near categorically. 
Certainly, the Attorney-General William Swainson, commenting two years after its conclusion, 
did not think that the Treaty intended British sovereignty to extent to Māori. In a letter to the 
Colonial Office, he wrote that ‘[i]f the sovereignty of the country has been usurped, it has not 
been usurped on the part or with the sanction of the British Government.”50 Thus, because of 
the heavily qualified and imprecise discussion of sovereignty in the Instructions, coupled with 
the ambiguity of the division of sovereignty in the Treaty, using originalism as an interpretive 
approach does not necessarily provide a more exact interpretation of these portions of the 
Treaty’s text. 
In the case of the pre-emption provision of the Treaty, the intentions for this portion of 
the text are only faintly expounded on in the Instructions. However, the Instructions were 
explicit that “[t]he acquisition of land by the Crown for the future settlement of British subjects 
must be confined to such districts as the natives can alienate without distress or serious 
inconvenience to themselves.” Yet there was no mention of this in the text of the Treaty, and 
no protection along these lines was offered in the agreement. This illustrates how the intent for 
a constitutional document does not necessarily filter through into the document itself, but still 
has the capacity to inform how the text is to be interpreted. In this case, though, originalism is 
confronted by a dilemma over which takes priority when interpreting a constitutional text: 
textualism or intentionalism? And what is the value of a specific intent if it fails to materialise 
in a constitutional text? Should it be an implicit interpolation in the text or should it be ignored 
as being contrary to the intention of the drafters of the text? In the case of the pre-emption 
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clause in the Treaty, instead of intentionalism “solv[ing] the question of interpretation,” as its 
proponents might expect, it confounds it.51  
A deeper layer of intentionalism can be gleaned from the philosophical influences that 
bore down on colonial officials in this era.  Chief among these were the works of Jeremy 
Bentham, which advocated (among much else) that the imposition of British law ought to be a 
key tenet of British colonies in this era, but that this law ought not to apply to “non-civilised” 
communities until they had become sufficiently civilised to benefit from the presence of British 
law.52 This philosophical element was extremely influential in British government policy-
formation in the 1830s.53 It can help explain the intent of the Treaty’s first article (in the English 
version), in which Māori sovereignty was ceded to the Crown, but possibly only to allow the 
Crown to govern its own subjects living in the colony, and then later, as Māori became 
“civilised,” the jurisdiction of British law could extend to them too (this would also explain the 
need expressed in the Instructions for the formation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines, 
which had as its specific goal the “civilising” of Māori). While such a suggestion is consistent 
with Bentham’s philosophies, it does not provide an exclusive interpretation of that part of the 
Treaty at the expense of other interpretations. Consequently, the influence of Bentham’s 
philosophies can be added as a possibility which gives another dimension to the meaning of 
the Treaty’s text, but broadens rather than narrows the range of meanings the Treaty can have. 
Of course, Bentham’s ideas never held exclusive sway over the thoughts of those 
responsible for formulating Britain’s policy on New Zealand in the late 1830s, which 
culminated in Normanby’s instructions. The fact that there was a multiplicity of intellectual 
influences that contributed to the form of British policy on the Treaty54 make the challenges of 
seeking an original intent of the Treaty that much more problematic. 
It was a handful of officials and others on the ground at Waitangi at the beginning of 
February 1840, however, who were responsible for converting Normanby’s Instructions into 
the text of the Treaty. The details of the process of this drafting, and of all of those involved, 
has already been comprehensively documented.55 As for their intentions, the record is 
incomplete. For the purpose of examining the efficacy of originalism in this context, it is 
worthwhile considering the evidence of the motives of the Treaty’s two key authors: Hobson 
and the outgoing British Resident to New Zealand, James Busby. As the Colonial Office did 
not supply Hobson with a draft treaty, it was principally up to him and Busby to devise the text.  
Hobson had completed some notes for the Treaty by 1 February 1840, based on his 
interpretation of the Instructions he had received before departing London, but fell ill, and so 
Busby fleshed these out and introduced his own additions to produce a full draft of the Treaty 
which formed the basis of the final version, that was completed by 4 February. The problem 
here for originalists is that neither Hobson nor Busby left any significant record of their 
intentions for how the Treaty ought to be interpreted, other than elementary statements they 
made regarding having been involved in the drafting and subsequent presentation of the text to 
the signatories. Hobson simply explained that when he met rangatira to obtain their accession 
to the Treaty, he “expounded its provisions, invited discussion, and offered elucidation,” 
without elaborating what this elucidation included.56 His statements on the purpose of the 
Treaty were largely reiterations of segments of the Instructions. For his part, Busby simply 
rehearsed (at the Waitangi signing) the essence of the Treaty’s content, in a simplified manner, 
in the hope that the rangatira present would understand its provisions.57  
Finally, the intentions of the Māori signatories to the Treaty need to be considered in 
order to assess the possible application of originalism from the perspective of the “original 
understanding,” or the “original public meaning of the text among those who accepted it.58 
Doubts about Māori being able to “comprehend the exact meaning or probable results” of the 
Treaty were raised by British officials even before the text had been produced.59 However, 
while there are contemporaneous accounts of Māori responses to the Treaty, these are 
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problematic for three main reasons: they were selected, translated and transcribed mainly by 
Europeans, and so a degree of cultural filtering affects their reliability; the opinions of only 
around five per cent of the signatories were collected; and in most cases, the comments of the 
rangatira that were recorded tended to be statements of opposition or support for the Treaty, 
rather than detailed accounts of how Māori interpreted all the provisions of the agreement.60 
 
Conclusion 
What is evident from this survey is that one of the probable reasons why originalism has not 
featured in any significant way in analyses of the Treaty is that it does not enable a more exact 
interpretation of the text to emerge. Indeed, the textualist approach only highlights the 
deficiencies in the wording of the agreement, and, if anything, risks obscuring the Treaty’s 
intended meaning. And in the search for an intentionalist interpretation, the Treaty’s meanings 
become even more diffuse, and there is little realistic chance of all the varied views coalescing 
– a problem that is compounded by the absence of sufficient evidence in the case of the drafter 
and signatories to determine their respective intentions in any comprehensive way.  
Given the possible varieties of interpretations of the text of the agreement, and the 
multiplicity of meanings that can be derived from the intentions (or absence of explicit 
intentions) of the parties involved in its devising, drafting, and endorsement, an originalist 
approach to the Treaty is more likely to confound efforts at recovering the original meaning of 
the document, and in fact suggests strongly that there may not have actually been a single 
original meaning of the Treaty in the first place – at least not one that would reconcile the 
intentions and understandings of all the parties involved in its creation and acceptance.61 In 
turn, this absence of a consensus among the Treaty’s framers, drafters, and signatories on its 
intended interpretation makes it much harder for any claim to be made that an originalist 
approach to the Treaty would somehow produce a more neutral or authoritative interpretation 
of the document, let alone that it could solve the question of the Treaty’s interpretation 
altogether.62  
A broad consensus of the Treaty’s meaning had emerged by the close of the twentieth 
century (although there is still not absolute uniformity in its current interpretation), but this was 
despite rather than because of any effort to seek an originalist interpretation of its provisions. 
Originalism – and the irreconcilable challenges it presents to interpreting the Treaty – has been 
superseded by the emergence of the Principles of the Treaty, which have both complemented 
the text of the agreement, and helped give effect to its provisions in a social, cultural, and 
political environment that would probably have been inconceivable to the creators and 
endorsers of the Treaty.63 
As much as later interpretations of a constitutional text potentially subvert its original 
meaning, there is a correlative risk that adherence to originalism as a presumably authoritative 
means of interpreting texts such as the Treaty subverts subsequent efforts to enable those texts 
to serve the evolving circumstances that affect the parties bound by it. And in the case of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, an originalist approach would more likely exacerbate the deficiencies of 
the text of the Treaty, rather than ameliorate them. 
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